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Abstract
The investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system has been
undergoing significant change along two fronts. First, multi-stakeholder
efforts, primarily led by States via the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), have recently been
considering various largely procedural reform options. Second,
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have likewise evolved in
recent years, influenced by, inter alia, new foreign investment priorities
and drafting approaches. Alongside this twin evolution, stakeholders
continue to express concerns regarding the effects, both direct and
indirect, of the ISDS system on human rights. As such, if the ISDS
system is to better accommodate human rights considerations, States
must deploy their many tools, such as negotiation and drafting of IIAs,
in furtherance of such objectives, while concurrently aligning such
efforts with ongoing discussions around procedural reforms, so as to
avoid unintended fragmentation and maximize impact. Ultimately, we
argue that the ISDS system may finally be positioned to bend the arc
of its trajectory toward a more accommodating system for human
rights. However, we caution that the focus on human rights remains
fairly limited—perhaps, at times, even a mere afterthought—suggesting
slow progress.
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I. Introduction: A Dawn for ISDS — Towards Reform?
The investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system has been
undergoing significant change along two fronts. First, multi-stakeholder
efforts, primarily led by States via the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), have recently been
considering various, largely procedural, reform options. Second,
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have likewise evolved in
recent years, influenced by, inter alia, new foreign investment priorities
and drafting approaches. Alongside this twin evolution, stakeholders
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continue to express concerns regarding the effects, both direct and
indirect, of the ISDS system on human rights. 1 In particular, the
inherent investor-centric bias of the ISDS system has been said to
negatively impact States’ efforts to satisfy its human rights obligations
on the international plane. 2
We consider the convergence of the future trajectory of ISDS,
encompassing both proposed procedural reform options and the recent
evolution of IIAs, with the longstanding expressed concerns of the
impact of the ISDS system on human rights. Several foci structure our
analysis. First, entrenched barriers persist regarding the opportunity
for a robust role for human rights considerations in the ISDS system.
Such barriers are both procedural and substantive, suggesting the
importance of broad reform efforts. Second, even where efforts have
been made to better accommodate human rights considerations within
the ISDS system, which human rights have been included remains
limited. As the scope of human rights norms and obligations expands,
so too must the ISDS system flex if it is to accommodate. Third, and
crucially, States continue to play a paramount role in both the
international human rights architecture and ISDS system. As such, if
the ISDS system is to better accommodate human rights considerations,
States must deploy their many tools, such as negotiation and drafting
of IIAs, in furtherance of such objectives—while concurrently aligning
such efforts with ongoing discussions around procedural reforms—so as
to avoid unintended fragmentation and maximize impact. Ultimately,
we argue that the ISDS system may finally be positioned to bend the
arc of its trajectory toward a more accommodating system for human
rights. However, we caution that the focus on human rights remains
fairly limited—perhaps, at times, even a mere afterthought—suggesting
slow progress.
In Section II, we first consider selected entrenched barriers, both
procedural and substantive, in the ISDS system that have historically
negatively impacted human rights considerations in the foreign
investment context, to diagnose the problem motivating reform.
Correspondingly, in Section III, we articulate the cumulative effects of
said barriers on States’ regulatory autonomy, which is part and parcel
to the satisfaction of their human rights obligations on the international
plane. In Sections IV–VI, we turn to ongoing reform developments, both
characterizing efforts to date and their potential impact on said
barriers. In Section IV, we introduce the so-called three “generations”
of rights framework, to help categorize the impact of each development
on the full spectrum of human rights. In Section V, we consider the
1.

See generally Markus Krajewski, A Nightmare or a Noble Dream?
Establishing Investor Obligations Through Treaty-Making and TreatyApplication, 5 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 105 (2020).

2.

Id. at 106.
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robust, ongoing dialogue around largely procedural reform options,
which has been primarily guided by UNCITRAL. In Section VI, we
explore trends in recent IIA development that may impact human
rights. Finally, in Section VII, we provide concluding thoughts on
whether reforms effort will meaningfully reduce the historical tensions
between the ISDS system and human rights.

II. Entrenched Barriers for Human Rights Claims in
ISDS
The ISDS system accords certain rights to businesses or individuals
qua foreign investors. 3 These rights “are not accorded to the investors
for the sake of human flourishing,” but are instead “instrumental” for
the exportation of capital. 4 At bottom, they are part of the “grand
bargain” by States via IIAs for purposes of attracting foreign capital.5
Moreover, these rights are only available to a limited subset of entities,
owing to the significant costs associated with instituting ISDS
proceedings. 6 In contrast, international human rights law accords rights
to all individuals qua human beings. 7 These rights are universal, not
selective. 8 They are also typically “domesticated,” which is to say that
they are protected primarily by domestic courts, 9 with international

3.

See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 44 (2d ed. 2012) (“International
investment law is designed to promote and protect the activities of private
foreign investors. . . . Investors are either individuals (natural persons) or
companies (juridical persons).”).

4.

ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (Larissa van den Herik & Jean
D’Aspremont eds., Jonathan Huston trans.) (2016).

5.

See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,
46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 77 (2005) (describing the grand bargain of IIAs
as a promise to protect capital in return for the prospect of more capital
in the future).

6.

PETERS, supra note 4, at 320.

7.

See G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”).

8.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Each State Party
to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.”) [hereafter ICCPR].

9.

PETERS, supra note 4, at 321.
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adjudicatory bodies playing primarily monitoring, not enforcement,
roles. 10
Consequently, the ISDS system and international human rights law
“have evolved along radically divergent paths” 11 and “rest on different
legal sources, contain different legal principles and are applied and
administered in different institutional settings.” 12 Moreover, their
intersection has been complicated by the ways in which human rights
can be introduced, both as a sword and shield, for strategic purposes
by the parties in a dispute. 13 Therefore, and perhaps unsurprisingly,
several entrenched barriers obstruct the role of human rights norms and
obligations within the ISDS system. Although international human
rights law does not accord businesses or individuals qua foreign
investors a privileged (normative) position, 14 this section seeks to
highlight such barriers, so as to understand how the ISDS system in
toto places downward pressure on States’ ability to satisfy its human
rights obligations on the international plane. 15
A.

Jurisdictional Barriers Have Generally Limited Human Rights
Claims in ISDS

Unsuccessful attempts to bring independent claims or
counterclaims alleging human rights violations underline both the
importance and complexities of establishing jurisdiction in investment
disputes. As a reflection of party consent, a tribunal only has
competence to hear claims that fall within its jurisdiction. 16 The scope
10.

See generally Clara Sandoval et al., Monitoring, Cajoling and Promoting
Dialogue: What Role for Supranational Human Rights Bodies in the
Implementation of Individual Decisions?, 12 J. HUM. RTS. PRACTICE 71
(2020).

11.

Moshe Hirsch, Investment Trbunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 97, 107 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).

12.

Krajewski, supra note 1, at 108.

13.

Hirsch, supra note 11, at 107.

14.

Id. at 108.

15.

See infra text accompanying notes 107–112.

16.

See ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND
IMPLICATIONS 132 (2014) (“The jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to
the specific category of dispute that the parties have accepted for
submission to the court or tribunal.”); Clara Reiner & Christoph
Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 82, 83 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]rbitral
tribunals draw their jurisdiction to make binding rulings on a dispute
solely from the consent of the parties. The tribunal’s jurisdiction is
consequently both based on and limited to that agreement.”).
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of the dispute resolution clause in both the IIA and the relevant
arbitration rules is, therefore, crucial for determining which claims the
tribunal may hear. 17 How a tribunal undertakes to interpret its own
jurisdiction has been crucial for determining the role of human rights
in investment disputes. 18
1. Rejecting Human Rights Claims Because They Are “Independent”
Claims

To the extent that a human rights issue affects a protected
investment under the IIA, it may become arbitrable by virtue of its
relationship to or impact on the investment. 19 Moreover, it has been
argued that, in principle, a broad dispute resolution clause could
provide for adjudicating a “pure human rights claim.” 20 Nonetheless,
the case law supports the general trend that human rights claims do
not have autonomous standing as independent claims before ISDS
tribunals. 21 As such, the independent significance of the dispute
resolution clause has been limited. 22 Biloune is the prototypical example
of this trend, where the tribunal expressed its reluctance to consider an
independent claim for an alleged human rights violation. 23 While the
tribunal described the dispute resolution clause as “broad,” 24 it
underscored its limited competence vis-à-vis the independent claim, 25
17.

See Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84–85.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

See Vivian Kube & E.U. Petersmann, Human Rights in International
Investment Arbitration, 11 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y
65, 73 (2016) (“[I]f the jurisdictional and applicable law clauses of the
respective IIA are sufficiently broad to include human rights violations,
adjudicating a pure human rights claim could be possible.”).

21.

Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
A Perspective from Within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107, 1123 (2012).

22.

Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and
International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CHISTOPOH SCHREUER 678, 679 (Christina Binder et al. eds.,
2009).

23.

See Biloune v. Ghana Inv. Ctr., Ad Hoc Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, 95 I.L.R. 187 (UNCITRAL Trib. Oct. 27, 1989).

24.

See id. at 202 (“The arbitration clause contained at Article 15 of the GIC
Agreement is broad, providing for arbitration of ‘[a]ny dispute between
the foreign investor and the Government in respect of an approved
enterprise’.”).

25.

See id. at 203. Although the tribunal acknowledged the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment that States must
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not least because the wording “in respect of an approved enterprise” in
said clause did not envision the parties’ consent to independent claims. 26
In contrast, though with a similar outcome, the tribunal in Chevron
construed the dispute resolution clause broadly such that it had the
jurisdiction to entertain a denial of justice claim relating to the
concession contracts underlying the dispute. 27 The claimants sought to
have the tribunal rely on customary international law in support of its
denial of justice claim, and cited to both human rights instruments28
and jurisprudence 29 in this regard. The tribunal, however, held that the
provisions in the IIA regarding denial of justice were lex specialis, which
precluded the need to refer to customary international law. 30 It did not
discuss the human rights references in its interpretation of the relevant
provision in the IIA, thereby leaving doubt as to whether, absent a lex
specialis, the claimants could have sustained its independent claim. 31
Similarly, in Toto, the tribunal again weighed a denial of justice
claim. 32 In this case, however, the tribunal discussed several human
rights instruments relating to denial of justice. 33 Ultimately, it denied
jurisdiction over the claim because of insufficient evidence. 34 While
some argue that the tribunal seemed open to considering human rights

accord foreign nationals within their territories, it held that “it does not
follow that this Tribunal is competent to pass upon every type of
departure from the minimum standard to which foreign nationals are
entitled, or that this Tribunal is authorized to deal with allegations of
violations of fundamental human rights.” Id.
26.

Id. at 188 (emphasis added).

27.

See Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877,
Interim Award, ¶ 209 (UNCITRAL Trib. Dec. 1, 2008) (“Its language
includes all disputes ‘arising out of or relating to’ investment agreements
and this language is broad enough to allow the Tribunal to hear a denial
of justice claim relating to the Concession Agreements.”).

28.

See Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877,
Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 166 (UNCITRAL Trib. Mar. 30, 2010)
(referencing the American Convention on Human Rights).

29.

See id. ¶ 170 (referencing the European Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights).

30.

Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, ¶¶ 242–45 (UNCITRAL
Trib. Dec. 1, 2008).

31.

Cf. Kube & Petersmann, supra note 20, at 74–75 (“Hence, it is impossible
to trace the precise impact of the human rights argumentation of the
investor on the arbitral award.”).

32.

Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 157–60 (Sept. 11, 2009).

33.

Id.

34.

Id. ¶ 168.
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as independent claims, 35 some caution is warranted. In particular, the
tribunal appeared to be referencing several external sources, including
human rights instruments, simply for purposes of clarifying its
statement that “[i]t has to be conceded that international law has no
strict standards to assess whether court delays are a denial of justice,”36
cautioning against extrapolating broader significance.
2. Rejecting Human Rights Counterclaims Because of a Narrow Reading
of the Requirements for Counterclaims

The scope of the dispute resolution clause is likewise relevant for
determining jurisdiction over counterclaims. 37 For States, where the
applicable IIA provides for sufficient investor responsibilities,
counterclaims can be a potential basis to allege human rights violations
by investors. 38 The ICSID Arbitration Rules, 39 UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, 40 and SCC Arbitration Rules 41 each provide for the possibility
that a tribunal may entertain a counterclaim. In determining its
jurisdiction over a counterclaim, a tribunal will typically consider two
factors, namely, whether the parties had consented to the possibility of
counterclaims and whether the counterclaim is sufficiently related to
the underlying claim in the dispute. 42 In practice, tribunals have largely
not permitted counterclaims for several reasons.
First, regarding whether the parties had consented to the possibility
of counterclaims, explicit consent is typically not present. 43 Two notable
35.

See Kube & Petersmann, supra note 20, at 75 (arguing that the tribunal
“appeared to be in principle open towards considering human rights as
independent claims”); Freya Baetens, Invoking Human Rights: A Useful
Line of Attack or a Defence Tool for States in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement?, in HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN ‘OTHER’ INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 227, 232 (Martin Scheinin ed., 2019) (“Not only did it show
willingness to accept the applicability of human rights law; it also seemed
open to considering independent human rights assertions on the merits.”).

36.

Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 155 (Sept. 11, 2009).

37.

See generally Barnali Choudhury, Investor Obligations for Human Rights,
35 ICSID REV. (forthcoming).

38.

Id.

39.

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 46, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereafter Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes].

40.

G.A. Res. 68/109 (2013).

41.

ARBITRATION INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHANGER
ARBITRATION RULES art. 9(1)(iii) (2017).

42.

See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 37.

43.

See id.
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exceptions concern the interconnected cases of Burlington44 and
Perenco, 45 where, in both cases, the parties had consented to the
counterclaims. Where consent is not explicitly present, however, a
tribunal will look to the wording of the dispute resolution clause. 46 If
the wording is sufficiently broad, a tribunal may choose to entertain
the counterclaim. 47 In Aven, the tribunal found that the dispute
settlement clause was “in principle wide enough” to envisage
counterclaims and, in particular, not exclusively claims brought by an
investor. 48 Similarly, in Urbaser, the tribunal construed the dispute
resolution clause broadly such that it provided for the “possibility” of
a host State, not just an investor, submitting a claim. 49
In contrast, several tribunals have denied jurisdiction over
counterclaims based on either narrowly construing the dispute
resolution clause to only permit claims brought by investors, not host
States, or a lack of consent by the investor. 50 In Spyridon Roussalis, the
tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because the dispute
resolution clause “undoubtedly” limited its jurisdiction only to claims
brought by investors, not host States. 51 Similarly, in Rusoro Mining,
the tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because the IIA
“does not leave room for doubt: [it] affords investors, and only investors,

44.

Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on Counterclaims, ¶ 60 (Feb. 7, 2017).

45.

Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/6, Decision on Perenco’s Application for Dismissal of Ecuador’s
Counterclaims, ¶ 44 (Aug. 18, 2017).

46.

Choudhury, supra note 37, at 14.

47.

See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing
Investment Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 474 (2013) (“Ab initio,
the tribunal’s decision with respect to counterclaims hinges on the
authority given it by the treaty and by an investor’s consent to arbitrate
according to the terms of the treaty.”).

48.

Aven v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award of
Tribunal, ¶ 740 (Sept. 18, 2018).

49.

Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶ 1153 (Dec. 8, 2016).

50.

See, e.g., id.

51.

Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶
869 (Dec. 7, 2011); but see Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/1, Declaration of W. Michael Reisman (Dec. 7, 2011) (“I
understand the line of their analysis but, in my view, when the States
Parties to a BIT contingently consent, inter alia, to ICSID jurisdiction,
the consent component of Article 46 of the Washington Convention is
ipso facto imported into any ICSID arbitration which an investor then
elects to pursue.”).
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standing to file arbitrations against host States . . . .” 52 In Vestey, the
tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because of a lack of
consent, owing to an insufficient connection between Venezuela’s
obligations under the IIA and the subject matter of the counterclaim.53
Moreover, in Gavazzi, the tribunal (by majority) denied jurisdiction
over a counterclaim, holding that “[w]here there is no jurisdiction
provided by the wording of the BIT in relation to a counterclaim, no
jurisdiction can be inferred merely from the ‘spirit’ of the BIT.” 54
Second, regarding whether the counterclaim is sufficiently related
to the underlying claim in the dispute, the case law is varied. In
Urbaser, the tribunal found a “factual link” between the two claims
because they were both based on the same investment vis-à-vis the
same IIA. 55 Similarly, in Goetz, the tribunal granted jurisdiction over a
counterclaim because its subject matter, regarding damages, flowed
from the underlying breach at issue in the primary claim. 56 In contrast,
in Saluka, while the tribunal acknowledged the difficulty in determining
a universal approach to establishing the appropriate degree of
connectedness between a counterclaim and underlying claim, 57 it denied
jurisdiction over the counterclaim because the legal basis was found in
Czech law, not the IIA. 58 Similarly, in Paushok, the tribunal denied
jurisdiction over the counterclaim due to a lack of connectedness with

52.

Rusoro Mining Ltd. V. Bolivarian Rebublic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶ 627 (Aug. 22, 2016).

53.

Vestey Group Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/4, Award, ¶ 333 (Apr. 15, 2016).

54.

Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Liability, ¶ 154 (Apr. 21, 2015); see also
Tomoko Ishikawa, Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v Romania: A
New Approach to Determining Jurisdiction over Counterclaims in ICSID
Arbitration?, 32 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 721, 725 (2017) (“IIAbased ICSID arbitration tribunals have consistently determined the
presence and absence of consent to jurisdiction over counterclaims by
scrutinizing the language of the dispute resolution clause, without
requiring an explicit authorization of counterclaims in the relevant IIA.
The emphasis placed by the . . . majority decision on the omission of
reference to counterclaims in the BIT is a departure from consistent case
law.”).

55.

Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶ 1151 (Dec. 8, 2016).

56.

Goetz v. Republique du Burundi, Affaire CIRDI No. ARB/01/2,
Sentence, ¶ 285 (June 21, 2012).

57.

See Saluka Invs. BV (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶
63 (PCA 2006) (“No single attempt to define this requirement with
universal effect is likely to be satisfactory”).

58.

Id. ¶ 79.
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the underlying claim and seemed to imply that matters concerning
domestic law can never satisfy the connectedness requirement. 59
B. Tribunals’ Interpretations of the Scope of the Applicable Law Has
Resulted in Inconsistent Practice

Even where the scope of the dispute resolution clause may not
permit a tribunal to entertain an independent claim or counterclaim, a
tribunal may, nonetheless, consider human rights by way of the
applicable law. 60 Indeed, which specific human rights might apply is
determined by the substantive standards of the applicable law. 61 If an
IIA specifies the applicable law, it is typically both domestic law and
international law. 62 If, however, an IIA is silent as to the applicable law,
it will be determined by the applicable rules of procedure. 63 Where a
tribunal has recourse to international law, it may introduce
international human rights norms, obligations, or instruments. 64
However, at least three barriers may persist regarding a robust role for
human rights qua applicable law.
First, the law does not obligate a tribunal to consider human rights,
even where the applicable law encompasses international law. 65 Indeed,
it may decide not to because it does not view human rights as directly
59.

Paushok v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 693
(UNCITRAL Apr. 28, 2011) (“In considering whether the Tribunal has
jurisdiction to consider the counterclaims, it must therefore decide
whether there is a close connection between them and the primary claim
from which they arose or whether the counterclaims are matters that are
otherwise covered by the general law of Respondent.”).

60.

Cf. DE BRABANDERE, supra note 16, at 134 (“[T]here is no reason for the
tribunal to exclude ipso facto human rights considerations as a matter of
applicable law.”).

61.

See Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84 (“[I]t does not suffice to
establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction over alleged violations of human
rights, since the analysis and evaluation of the breaches will depend upon
the applicable substantive standards.”).

62.

NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2015); see also Reiner &
Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84 (describing such clauses as “composite
choice of law clauses”).

63.

See,
e.g.,
Convention
on
the
Settlement
of
Investment
Disputes, supra note 39, art. 42(1) (providing that, failing an agreement
between the parties as to the applicable law, the tribunal must apply the
domestic law of the host State and “such rules of international law as may
be applicable”); see also ICSID Convention, Regulations and
Rules, art. 42, Apr. 2006 (clarifying that “international law” in Article
42(1) has been interpreted as reflective of Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute).

64.

DE BRABANDERE, supra note 16, at 134–36.

65.

See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 39.
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impacting the core issues of the dispute. For example, in CMS,
Argentina argued that “as the economic and social crisis that affected
the country compromised basic human rights, no investment treaty
could prevail as it would be in violation of such constitutionally
recognized rights.” 66 The tribunal disagreed with this attempt to
privilege human rights vis-à-vis the IIA, finding that “there is no
question of affecting fundamental human rights” in the case. 67
Second, if a tribunal decides to consider human rights, which
specific human rights norms, obligations, or instruments it introduces
are at its discretion. 68 Moreover, the scope of certain human rights,
particularly second and third-generation human rights, may not be
precise, thus creating confusion on the obligations of States regarding
those rights. 69 Urbaser aptly illustrates this flexibility. In that case, the
tribunal observed that the IIA was not “a closed system strictly
preserving investors’ rights,” 70 but a part of international law, thereby
including human rights. 71 It then discussed an array of human rights
instruments, including several nonbinding instruments, seeming to treat
each as having equal dispositive weight. 72 It further expressed its
“reluctan[ce]” to accept that guaranteeing the right to water must be
exclusively a State obligation 73 and stated, rather controversially and
absent substantiation, that “international law accepts corporate social
responsibility.” 74
66.

CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 114 (May 12, 2005).

67.

Id. ¶ 121.

68.

See Monica Feria-Tinta, Like Oil and Water? Human Rights in
Investment Arbitration in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Uruguay, 34 J.
INT’L ARB. 601, 628 (2017) (discussing how human rights and
international investment law have a ‘tense’ relationship).

69.

See infra text accompanying notes 111–120 (discussing second and third
generation human rights).

70.

Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶ 1191 (Dec. 8, 2016).

71.

Id. ¶ 1192.

72.

Id.¶¶ 1196–8.

73.

Id. ¶ 1193; see Krajewski, supra note 1, at 124 (“Yet, if there is a human
right obligation to provide water to the citizens and if the investor is
bound by human rights it is not convincing that the investor would not
be bound by such an obligation as well.”).

74.

Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 2016 ICSID
¶ 1195; see Krajewski, supra note 1, at 124–5 (“The tribunal not only
erroneously held that Article 30 of the UDHR and Article 5 of the
ICCPR contain a legal basis of human rights obligations of individuals
and companies . . . [T]he tribunal’s reasoning does not reflect the
current state of human rights law.”).
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Third, even supposing that a tribunal introduces human rights
norms, the role that such norms play in the decision may vary. In
Urbaser, human rights considerations discussed by the tribunal had a
dispositive impact on the merits of the counterclaim, 75 although not in
a manner that supported human rights as such. In Suez–InterAgua,
Argentina argued that its obligations regarding the right to water
superseded its obligations under the IIA and the presence of such a
right enabled it to take actions contrary to its obligations under the
BIT. 76 The tribunal concluded that it could “not find a basis for such
a conclusion either in the BITs or international law,” and held that
Argentina was subject to the obligations arising under both human
rights and the IIAs. 77 Hence, and as quintessentially representative of
the attendant challenges for States, “Argentina’s human rights
obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent,
contradictory, or mutually exclusive.” 78
C. Continued Scarcity of Investor Responsibilities in IIAs

Currently, investors do not have direct obligations regarding
human rights on the international plane. 79 It has, however, been said
that businesses have a “social license to operate.” 80 Indeed, the Human
Rights Council has underscored “imbalances” between businesses and
States, which may negatively impact human rights, as a result of the
proliferation of IIAs and their role in the ISDS system. 81 In particular,
given the expansion of nonbinding global norms regarding responsible
business conduct, it has been argued that “IIAs are seemingly now at
odds with contemporary practice defining business responsibility.”82
While efforts continue to establish binding human rights obligations for
corporations on the international plane, 83 provisions in IIAs establishing
investor responsibilities remain relatively permissive. 84 Selected
75.

See Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 2016 ICSID ¶¶ 1206–10.

76.

Suez-InterAgua
v.
Argentine
Republic,
ICSID
No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶ 240 (July 30, 2010).

Case

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

PETERS, supra note 4, at 101.

80.

Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right
to Development, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 54 (Apr. 7, 2008).

81.

Id. ¶ 12.

82.

Choudhury, supra note 37, at 2.

83.

See, e.g., id.

84.

Jesse Coleman et al., International Investment Agreements 2018: A
Review of Trends and New Approaches, YEARBOOK ON INT’L.
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categorical examples are discussed here, to illustrate their impact, while
Section VI provides an exhaustive analysis of recent trends.
First, IIAs may contain operative provisions requiring that
investors comply with the laws of the host State, typically only during
the establishment phase of the investment. 85 For example, the
Argentina–UAE BIT broadly requires that “the investors and
investments of each Party shall comply with the laws, regulations, and
policies of the host Party with respect to the management, operation,
and disposition of investments.” 86 Noncompliance with domestic laws,
in this instance, “will have an international legal effect.” 87 Tribunals
have relied on such provisions to deny jurisdiction over an investor’s
claim. 88 Other tribunals have applied proportionality to their analyses

INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 2018, §7, §7.73–4 (2018); see also Jean Ho, The
Creation of Elusive Investor Responsibility, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 10, 13 (2019) (“When corporate investors, whether motivated
by profit or civic duty, voluntarily adopt sustainable and lawful business
practices, the pursuit of investor responsibility in international fora
becomes redundant.”).
85.

See Matthew C. Bate, Stephen Khon & Cynthia Liu, Investment
Treaties: What Every Emerging Market Investor Needs to Know,
EMPEA, https://www.empea.org/research/investment-treaties-whatevery-emerging-market-investor-needs-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/G8UV-AMDN].

86.

Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Arg.-U.A.E., art. 14(a), Apr. 16, 2018.

87.

Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 394 (Aug. 16, 2007).

88.

Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment,
¶ 118 (Dec. 23, 2010); Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El
Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 335 (Aug. 2, 2006);
Alasdair Ross Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, ¶ 59 (May 19, 2010).
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of such provisions to both grant 89 and deny 90 jurisdiction. In particular,
to the extent that domestic laws include human rights-related
obligations for businesses vis-à-vis foreign investments, they may be a
jurisdictional bar to investor’s claims.
Second, IIAs may contain operative provisions seeking to combat
corruption, which can be directed to either the parties or investors.91
For example, the Brazil–Ethiopia BIT provides that the parties “shall
adopt measures and make efforts to prevent and fight corruption,
money laundering and terrorism financing” regarding matters within
the scope of the agreement. 92 For another example, the Belarus–India
BIT provides that investors “shall not, either prior to or after the
establishment of an investment, offer, promise, or give any undue
pecuniary advantage, gratification or gift whatsoever, whether directly
or indirectly, to a public servant or official of a Party as an inducement
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or obtain or
maintain other improper advantage nor shall be complicit in inciting,
aiding, abetting, or conspiring to commit such acts.” 93 Notably, breach
of this provision precludes investors from initiating arbitrations under
the agreement. 94 While some tribunals have relied on the presence of
corruption to deny jurisdiction, 95 other tribunals have carefully parsed
89.

See, e.g., Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v.
Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 483 (Mar.
30, 2015) (“The Tribunal agrees with the view that not every trivial,
minor contravention of the law should lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. It
must strike a balance between two criteria.”); Vladislav Kim v. Republic
of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
413 (Mar. 8, 2017) (“In the Tribunal’s view, the interpretive task is guided
by the principle of proportionality. The Tribunal must balance the object
of promoting economic relations by providing a stable investment
framework with the harsh consequence of denying the application of the
BIT in total when the investment is not made in compliance with
legislation.”).

90.

E.g., Cortec Mining Kenya Ltd., Cortec (Pty) Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya,
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award of the Tribunal, ¶¶ 319–21 (Oct. 22,
2018).

91.

See Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and
Facilitation, Brazil-Eth., art. 15(1), Apr. 11, 2018.

92.

Id.

93.

Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on
Investments, Belr.-India, art. 11(ii), Sept. 24, 2018.

94.

Id. at art. 13.3.

95.

See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006) (“[T]his Tribunal is convinced
that bribery is contrary to the international public policy of most, if not
all, States or, to use another formula, to transnational public policy. Thus,
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the relationship between the corrupt acts and the investment to decline
to deny jurisdiction. 96 Moreover, the presence of corruption itself
requires complicity on the part of the host State, 97 belying complex
dynamics for a tribunal to sort.
Third, IIAs may contain operative provisions regarding corporate
social responsibility (“CSR”), although the practical effect of such
provisions remains unknown and likely minimal, 98 due to the drafting
of the provisions. CSR provisions often employ broad, open-textured
language. 99 They are also often couched in nonbinding terms requiring,
for example, that investors “strive” or “endeavor” to achieve certain
human rights objectives. 100 In many instances, they are directed to

claims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by
corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral Tribunal.”); Metal-Tech
Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶
290 (Oct. 4, 2013).
96.

E.g., Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. v. People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 454
(Aug. 19, 2013) (holding that, because “the [joint venture agreement] had
been concluded long before the acts of corruption”, the tribunal retained
jurisdiction).

97.

See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 180 (Oct. 4, 2006) (“[O]n the evidence before this
Tribunal, the bribe was apparently solicited by the Kenyan President and
not wholly initiated by the Claimant.”).

98.

But see David Gaukrodger, Consultation Paper by the OECD Secretariat,
Business Responsibilities and Investment Treaties ¶¶ 401–04 (Jan. 15,
2020) (highlighting the purposes of such provisions, such as: leveling the
playing field between products produced in host versus home States under
different regulatory regimes regarding responsible business conduct;
potentially overcoming objections to the extraterritorial reach of activities
in the host State; and providing a foundation for applying doctrines like
“clean hands” for purposes of both bringing a claim or recovery).

99.

E.g., Agreement between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 17, Dec. 1, 2018
(providing that the parties reaffirm the importance of encouraging
investors to voluntarily incorporate “internationally recognised standards,
guidelines and principles of corporate social responsibility that have been
endorsed or are supported by” the party in whose jurisdiction the investor
operates).

100. E.g., Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, BrazilU.A.E., art. 15(1), Mar. 15, 2019 (“Investors and their investment shall
strive to achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the
sustainable development of the Host State and the local community,
through the adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices,
based on the voluntary principles, and standards set out in the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.”).
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States, rather than investors. 101 The Morocco-Nigeria BIT is a notable
exception in this regard, requiring that investors “uphold” human rights
in the host State, 102 although the use of “uphold,” rather than “respect,
protect, and fulfill” creates some confusion. 103 Other IIAs contain
related, but more permissive provisions. 104 Finally, the consequences for
breach of binding or nonbinding CSR provisions can be unclear, thereby
reducing their practical effects. 105
The diagram below illustrates the different typologies when it
comes to investor responsibilities:
Investor
Responsibilities

Provisions to comply
with host State laws

Provisions to combat
corruption

Provisions to address
Corporate Social
Responsibility

Broad/open-ended
language or
aspirational language

Limited to the
Establishment Phase

Often directed at
States and not at
investors

101. Id. at art. 15(2).
102. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art. 18(2), Dec. 3, 2016.
103. Krajewski, supra note 1, at 115.
104. E.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, Brazil-Malawi,
art. 9(1), June 25, 2015 (“Investors and their investment shall strive to
achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the sustainable
development of the Host Party and the local community, through the
adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices, based on the
voluntary principles and standards set out in this Article.”).
105. Coleman et al., supra note 84, ¶ 7.79.

133

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New
Investment Treaties Support Human Rights?

III. Potential Impact of ISDS Claims on a State’s
Regulatory Autonomy Resulting in a Regulatory
Chill
Regulatory autonomy has been referred to as “the legal right
exceptionally permitting the host state to regulate in derogation of
international commitments it has undertaken by means of an
investment agreement without incurring a duty to compensate.”106
States exercise their regulatory autonomy to enact domestic measures
that provide for satisfaction of their direct obligations regarding human
rights. 107 Such obligations can exist regionally or internationally.108
While States only consent to the regional or international human rights
instruments to which they wish to be party, their direct obligations
regarding human rights on the international plane likewise originate in
customary international law. 109 Moreover, States have the primary
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of all
individuals within their jurisdiction in the context of corporate

106. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT
INVESTMENT LAW 33 (2014).

TO

REGULATE

IN

INTERNATIONAL

107. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 41–43 (discussing the importance of “horizontal
enforcement” in human rights law).
108. See generally Başak Çalı, Regional Protection, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 411, 411–424 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2018)
(discussing the historical relationship between regional and international
human rights obligations and instruments).
109. See Henkin, supra note 107, at 35–41 (arguing that “[i]nternational human
rights law is a revolutionary penetration of the once impermeable state”
and describing the emergence of customary international law obligations
regarding human rights).
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activities, 110 including specifically with regard to obligations arising
under the ICCPR 111 and ICESCR. 112
The effect of the ISDS system on States’ efforts to satisfy its
obligations on the international legal plane, whether directly relating to
human rights or otherwise, has been described as “chilling.” 113 Broadly,
so-called regulatory chill refers to the fact that “[i]n some
circumstances, governments will respond to a high (perceived) threat
of investment arbitration by failing to enact or enforce bona fide
regulatory measures (or by modifying measures to such an extent that
their original intent is undermined or their effectiveness is severely
diminished).” 114 Indeed, as South Africa described during the WGIII
discussions regarding ISDS reform:

110. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, at I(A)(1) (2011)
(“States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This
requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and
redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and
adjudication.”).
111. See ICCPR, supra note 8 at art. 2(1); see also Office of the High Comm’r
for Human Rts., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 May 2004, ¶ 8 (adopted Mar. 29, 2004)
(“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not
just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against
acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the
enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application
between private persons or entities.”).
112. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art.
2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.”).
113. See, e.g., Krajewski, supra note 1, at 112; Choudhury, supra note 38, at
6; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 70, 77; Suzanne A. Spears, Making
Way for the Public Interest in International Investment Agreements, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 271–72
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory
Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606-10
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
114. Tienhaara, supra note 113, at 610.
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Often, investors use ISDS strategically, publicly and repeatedly
filing cases to coerce governments to agree on favourable terms
for their investments, rather than turning to ISDS as a measure
of last resort. Even though IIAs do not in themselves directly
limit the legislative or regulatory powers of States, they may lead
governments to thread more cautiously—and hence potentially
insufficiently from a public-interest perspective—when planning
and designing regulation. As such, governments might refrain
from imposing regulatory measures in the public interest due to
the threat of investment arbitration and the high damages it
entails. 115

Recent cases in investment treaty arbitration have shown that
international regulation of foreign investment can touch upon sensitive
areas of public concern, such as environmental regulation, 116 a
regulation protecting the public health, 117 measures relating to energy
policies, 118 measures taken to protect indigenous cultures and cultural
heritage, 119 urban policy, 120 and taxation. 121
The current backlash towards the ISDS partly stems from the fact
that the treaty terms are indeterminate and, therefore, the degree of
delegation to decentralized arbitral tribunals has resulted in broad
interpretations that were often not envisioned by State parties. 122 This
115. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS): Submission from the Government of South Africa, ¶ 63, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176 (July 17, 2019).
116. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Final Award on Jurisdiction
and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Case,
Award (Aug. 2, 2010).
117. Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/07, Award (July 8, 2016).
118. Charanne B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Com. Case No. 062/2012, Final Award (Jan. 21, 2016).
119. Glamis Gold Ltd v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Award (June 8, 2009)
120. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award (May 25, 2004).
121. Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Co. v. The Government of Mongolia,
UNCITRAL Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Apr. 28, 2011);
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5, Decision on LIability (Dec. 14, 2012).
122. Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls, Reassertion of Control: An
Introduction, in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INV. TREATY
REGIME 25 (Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls eds., 2016) (“A high level
of control lies undoubtedly with the Contracting Parties with regard to
treaty drafting, amendment and termination. However, as long as a
tribunal may interpret the IIA, drafting and amendment are no warranty
that the tribunal follows exactly what the Contracting Parties had in
mind”).
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results in an asymmetric system that is allegedly skewed towards the
investor with constant sidelining of regulatory powers of the State and
human rights concerns raised by them. 123 The challenge for States
becomes ensuring satisfaction of their direct human rights obligations,
including vis-à-vis businesses, within the constraints of the ISDS
system, which can be especially difficult in emergency situations, such
as a financial crisis requiring rapid and decisive regulatory actions in
service of human rights. 124 One obvious remedy that States have
adopted to that end has involved redrafting treaties to provide more
clarity and potentially insert institutional and procedural mechanisms
that control or limit the exercise of delegated interpretation. 125

IV. Creating a Human Rights Typology to Evaluate
the ISDS Reform Process: The Three “Generational”
of Human Rights
Before delving into the thematic characteristics of the reform
proposals, it is pertinent to chart out the conceptualization of human
rights for the purposes of this paper. We seek to utilize the framework
developed by Karel Vašák: a threefold taxonomy for classifying human
rights. 126 While we do not seek to delve into the merits of the taxonomy,
we lay a broad outline for the purposes of this paper as it acts as a
prism through which the unique nature of ISDS vis-à-vis human rights
123. Lorenzo Cotula & Brooke Güven, Investor-State Arbitration: An
Opportunity for Real Reform?, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT:
BLOG
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://www.iied.org/investor-state-arbitration-opportunity-for-realreform [https://perma.cc/WK9F-X9M8].
124. See Choudhury, supra note 37, at 6 (“Yet when States are confronted
with new situations—such as in a financial crisis or upon becoming aware
of a new health peril—it may need to enact new regulations that can
impede investors’ rights. In these instances, States must choose whether
to regulate to protect human rights or interfere with investors’ rights and
risk an adverse, and often costly, arbitral award.”).
125. Eleni Methymaki & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Masters of Puppets?
Reassertion of Control through Joint Investment Treaty Interpretation,
in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME
161–62 (Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls eds., 2016) (“However,
interpretation by the parties remains as an important safeguard so that
they will not end up being bound by obligations they did not really (mean
to) assume”).
126. Karel Vašák, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained
Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 30 UNESCO COURIER 29–32 (1977); see also Sumner B. Twiss,
Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures: Interpreting Human Rights in the
International Community, 26 J. RELIG. ETHICS 271, 272 (1998) for a
description of a similar taxonomy of human rights.
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may be seen. The three generations of rights elucidated above are
described below in greater clarity to establish a working framework of
the three generations of rights.
According to Vašák, first-generation rights encompass negative
rights and correspond to civil and political rights. 127 Civil-political
human rights primarily include two categories: rights relating to
physical security (e.g., prohibition against torture, slavery, arbitrary
arrest) and rights relating to civil liberties (e.g., fair trial, right to
property, due process, judicial efficiency etc.). 128 Such rights find their
genesis in legal documents such as the Magna Carta 129 and the United
States Bill of Rights. 130 In their modern form, they are enshrined in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 131 and may
primarily be viewed in a “negative sense.” 132 This prohibits the State
from undertaking acts that may be detrimental to the civil and political
liberties of its citizens (“First-Generation Rights”).
Second-generation rights reflect a positive action on behalf of the
State to include economic, social, and cultural rights. 133 Similarly, socioeconomic rights are bifurcated into two categories: rights relating to
social needs (e.g., water, nutrition, health care etc.) and rights relating
to economic needs (e.g., fair wage, healthcare insurance, etc.). 134 In
contrast to First-Generation Rights, rights under this category place an
obligation on the State to undertake positive acts to bolster the social,
economic and cultural status of its citizens. 135 The prominent
international legal instrument for such rights is the International

127. Vašák, supra note 126, at 29.
128. David Pupovac, Spasimir Domaradzki, & Margaryta Khvostova, Karel
Vasak’s Generations of Rights and the Contemporary Human Rights
Discourse, 20 HUM. RTS. REV. 423, 437 (2019) (“The dominant bigrams
in the first generation of rights are ‘civil society,’ ‘war crimes,’ ‘human
dignity,’ ‘death penalty,’ ‘crimes (against) humanity,’ ‘property rights,’
‘freedom of association,’ and ‘religious freedom.’).
129. Magna Carta, 1215, (Eng.).
130. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
131. ICCPR, supra note 8.
OF
EUR.,
132. The
Evolution
of
Human
Rights,
COUNCIL
https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/the-evolution-of-human-rights
[https://perma.cc/4HPU-P3A6]

133. Id.
134. Lindsey Reid, The Generations of Human Rights, UAB INST. FOR HUM.
RTS. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2019/01/14/the-generations-ofhuman-rights/ [https://perma.cc/EN7V-RQX6].
135. Id.
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Second
Generation Rights”). 136
Finally, third-generation rights encompass so-called collective
rights, such as the right to a healthy environment and right to
participation in cultural heritage. 137 Rights of such nature focus on the
collective action of society as a whole and include within its ambit,
inter alia, the rights to self-determination, and preservation of a healthy
environment. 138 By placing their emphasis on collective action of States
and individuals, such rights may be found in international instruments
such as the Stockholm Declaration, 139 Declaration on the Right to
Development, 140 and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People 141 (“Third-Generation Rights”).
Traditionally, the ISDS regime has recognized certain civil and
political rights, perhaps most notably the right to property, but also
access to justice and due process. 142 As such, it has primarily focused
on these certain First-Generation Rights. In contrast, SecondGeneration Rights have received only modest attention within the ISDS
regime. Notably, Second- and Third-Generation Rights have recently
been discussed in the context of evolving operative provisions in IIAs143
and drafting new model investment agreements. 144 However, on the

136. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
137. Spasimir Domaradzki,Margaryta Khvostova & David Pupovac, Karel
Vasak’s Generations of Rights and the Contemporary Human Rights
Discourse, 20 HUM. RTS. REV. 423 (Sept. 6, 2019).
138. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5–16, 1972).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration
on
Environment
and
Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992).
141. See G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Mar. 2008).
142. Kabir A.N. Duggal, ISDS Reform and Advancing All “Generations” of
Human Rights, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nicholas J. Diamond ed. June 17,
2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/06/17/isdsreform-and-advancing-all-generations-of-human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/3HHG-LH2A].
143. See generally Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to
Incorporating Human Rights Issues into International Investment
Agreements, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 670 (2011).
144. See generally Kabir A.N. Duggal & Laurens H. van de Ven, The 2019
Netherlands Model BIT: Riding the New Investment Treaty Waves, 35
ARB. INT’L 347 (2019).
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whole, Second- and Third-Generation Rights have not factored
prominently in ISDS.

V. Key Reform Proposals for the Future of ISDS
With this framework in mind, we delve into the substance of key
reform proposals. We first focus on the UN negotiations to reform ISDS
conducted under the aegis of the UNCITRAL Working Group III
(“Working Group III”). 145 Consequently, we delve into a major
European proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court (“Multilateral
Investment Court”). Finally, at an institutional level we analyze the
proposal for amendment to the ICSID Rules.
Α. UNCITRAL Working Group Report III — Are solely procedural
reforms adequate?

The decentralized nature of ISDS provides a State with multiple
avenues of reform discussions ranging from ICSID Workshops,146
UNCTAD events, 147 OECD conferences, 148 and various other regional
forums. 149 Working Group III has emerged as the umbrella multilateral
forum bringing several relevant stakeholders to the table. In line with
the UNCITRAL process, Working Group III was entrusted with
ensuring deliberations among the widest possible breadth of available
expertise from relevant stakeholders. 150 The mandate of the Working
Group III encompasses identification and consideration of concerns
regarding ISDS, whether reforms may be desirable and, if so, develop
and recommend options to UNCITRAL. 151 The Working Group III by
145. See, e.g., UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement,
IISD (July 2017), https://www.iisd.org/projects/uncitral-and-reforminvestment-dispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/E49V-PYDT].
146. See News & Events, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-andevents/events [https://perma.cc/TN66-MML5].
147. Meetings
and
Events, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/meetingssearch?Operator=and&keys=oecd [https://perma.cc/N3YL-WGVN].
148. Meetings / Conferences / Agendas, OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/publicationsdocuments/meetingsconfer
encesagendas/ [https://perma.cc/P39M-CJBL].
149. See also Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules (ICSID Working
Paper, Paper No. 4, 2020) (discussing proposals for amending the ICSID
Arbitration Rules).
150. Draft Rep. of the Working Grp. III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964
(2018).
151. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Information
on Options for Implementing a Workplan, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
L., Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform)
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its very mandate limits itself to procedural aspects of ISDS. 152 It was
clarified in explicit terms that the “mandate given to the working group
focused on the procedural aspects of dispute settlement rather than on
the substantive provisions.” 153 At the same time, broad discretion was
proffered on Working Group III with regard to solutions it would
devise, after taking into account the view of all States. 154
Thus, by divorcing substantive aspects of ISDS reform from its
mandate, the stage is set for the reform proposal to focus minimally on
Second- and Third-Generation Rights. Working Group III was tasked
with a laser-focused mandate of placing sole emphasis on improving
certain First-Generation Rights. 155 The reform agenda is currently
examining several issues. First, the Working Group III briefly
considered alternative modes of arbitral appointments 156 and sought to
develop a code of conduct to mitigate an apparent lack of independence
for arbitrators. 157 The appointment of arbitrators has been blithely

Thirty-Seventh Session, Note by the Secretariat, Apr. 1–5, 2019, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.158 (Jan. 25, 2019).
152. See, e.g., UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement,
IISD (July 2017), https://www.iisd.org/projects/uncitral-and-reforminvestment-dispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/E49V-PYDT].
153. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, ¶ 20 (2017) [hereinafter Report of
Working Group III - 34th Session].
154. See Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., ¶ 264,
U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (2017) (emphasizing that each State has “the choice
of whether and to what extent it wished to adopt the relevant
solution(s)”).
155. Duggal, supra note 142.
156. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Selection and Appointment of ISDS Tribunal
Members, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169
(2019) [hereinafter Possible Reform of ISDS - Selection and Appointment]
(noting that “disputing parties normally enjoy broad powers in the
selection of arbitrators” and “the rules applicable in investor-State
arbitration allow disputing parties to agree on the method to select the
arbitrators and to agree directly upon their identity”).
157. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Background Information on a Code of
Conduct, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.167
(2019) (“At the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the [UNCITRAL]
Working Group . . . it was suggested that measures enhancing confidence
in the independence and impartiality of ISDS tribunal members would be
in the interest of both States and investors”).
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unregulated 158 in the ISDS regime, resulting in private commercial law
practitioners occupying Tribunal positions, which explains the secondgrade treatment provided to crucial human rights issues. 159 Thus, the
Working Group III seeks to further various ideas such as utilization of
a pre-established roster of arbitrators (that takes into account gender
balance, diversity and geographical distributions) 160 and a more
emphasized role of arbitral institutions in appointments. 161 Thus, such
foundational reforms towards regulating arbitrator appointments in the
ISDS regime ensures a step towards “competent, independent and
impartial” 162 adjudicators in the true sense.
Second, the Working Group III is considering issues relating to
counterclaims, costs, and durations of ISDS proceedings. 163 It has noted
that obligations of investors in instances such as human rights,
environment and corporate social responsibilities fall under the
umbrella consideration of counterclaims. 164 The Working Group even
158. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note
156, at ¶10 (noting that the selection and appointment of arbitrators is
“flexible” and “not strictly regulated”).
159. See Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human
Rights?, 60 INST. INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 573, 576–77 (2011) (“This
might be in the investment arbitrators’ genes, because what is probably
the large majority of them has a private or commercial law rather than a
public law or public international law background and might thus tend
to see international human rights as a potential, or probable, cause of
political disturbances, intruding in their ‘purely legal’, autonomous field,
with its ground rules being determined by neo-liberal thought. In a way,
this is not hard to understand, because, after all, protection of foreign
investment is to benefit the investor, while human-rights-based claims, if
and when they arise in investment disputes, will mainly appear as defenses
argued by States that have interfered in such investments.”).
160. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note
156, ¶ 26 (noting that “[o]verall, a roster should take into account the
gender balance, geographical distribution, and balancing between
arbitrators from developing and developed countries”).
161. See id. ¶ 35 (“A system where institutions administering ISDS cases
would play a greater role in the selection and appointment of members of
ISDS tribunals is an option for reform that could be considered in
conjunction with the creation of a roster.”)
162. See ICCPR Art. 14(1), supra note 8, at 176.
163. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note
156, ¶ 17.
164. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-seventh
Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970, ¶ 34 (2019)
[hereinafter Report of Working Group III - 37th Session] (noting the
related issues of “obligations of investors (for example, in relation to
human rights, the environment as well as to corporate social
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goes on to allude to the notion of protecting sustainable development
as a legal basis for furthering counterclaims. 165 The Working Group III
sought to potentially consider claims by third parties against
investors. 166 Thus, despite the mandate of the Working Group III being
limited to procedural matters, 167 counterclaims may prove to be a
crucial substantive reform it has taken within its ambit to bolster
Second-and Third-Generation Rights.
At its 39th Session, the Working Group III further attempted to
forward key reforms to tackle concurrent proceedings, frivolous claims,
security for costs and abuse of process. 168 By seeking to chop off
inefficiencies to chart a more robust justice delivery mechanism, we see
a clear advancement of certain First-Generation Rights of ensuring a
procedural economy in a dispute resolution system. 169 Moreover, the
Working Group III has prioritized coherence and consistence in
interpretation by considering treaty parties’ involvement and control
mechanisms on treaty interpretation. 170 It has considered mechanisms
such as release of travaux préparatoires and greater usage 171 of
responsibility)” and “the question of allowing counterclaims by States as
well as claims by third parties against investors”).
165. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Multiple Proceedings and Counterclaims, Note
by the Secretariat, 2020 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.193, ¶¶ 40–41
(2020) [hereinafter Possible Reform of ISDS - Multiple Proceedings and
Counterclaims] (“[T]he Working Group may wish to consider formulating
provisions on investor obligations which would form the basis for a State’s
counterclaims . . . The Working Group may wish to further consider how
to impose such obligations in investment treaties as well as in relevant
contracts or domestic laws governing foreign investment.”).
166. Report of Working Group III - 37th Session, supra note 164, ¶ 34.
167. Report of Working Group III - 34th Session, supra note 153, ¶ 20.
168. Possible Reform of ISDS – Multiple Proceedings and Counterclaims, supra
note 165, ¶ 30.
169. See) CCJE Opinions and Magna Carta, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 24,
2004), https://rm.coe.int/168074752d [https://perma.cc/Q5FM-SZXR]
(choose “Opinion n°6 (2006)) (“The CCJE considers that the judicial
system should not obstruct access to justice through excessive costs . . . .
Under Principle 2, judges should have power to control abuse of
procedure, by sanctions on a party or lawyers.”).
170. See Draft Rep. of the Working Grp. III, supra note 150.
171. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Interpretation of Investment treaties by
Treaty
Parties,
Note
by
the
Secretariat,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.191, ¶ 38 (2020) [hereinafter Possible Reform of
ISDS - Interpretation of Investment Treaties by Treaty Parties] (“It
should be noted that, according to UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub,
126 of the 2,573, treaties analysed (4.9 per cent) are marked as expressly

143

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New
Investment Treaties Support Human Rights?

institutionalized cooperation between treaty parties to establish
standing bodies, 172 thereby facilitating common interpretations. 173
There exists continued apprehensions from all corners 174 that a
solely procedural mandate would drastically diminish the opportunity
to address core substantive issues. 175 This apprehension is magnified by
the fact that substantive issues often form the basis of growing
discontentment amongst developing countries stemming from
“expropriation, most-favoured-nation treatment, non-discrimination,
and fair and equitable treatment, all of which have been given unduly
allowing for binding interpretations by the contracting parties or by
interpretative committees or commissions. Only thirty-one treaties, or
slightly over 1.56 per cent contain institutional arrangements in the form
of interpretative committees or commissions.”).
172. See, e.g., Canada Honduras Free Trade Agreement, Can.- Hond. art.
21.1.3, Oct. 1, 2014 (“The Commission may: (a) adopt interpretive
decisions concerning this Agreement, which shall be binding on the
dispute settlement panels established under Article 21.10 and on
Tribunals established under Section C of Chapter Ten (Investment –
Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of the Other
Party)”); Agreement between The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union
and Montenegro on The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Belg.-Montenegro art.13, Feb. 16, 2010 (“the dispute shall
be submitted to a joint commission consisting of representative of the two
parties”).
173. See Possible Reform of ISDS - Interpretation of Investment Treaties by
Treaty Parties, supra note 171, ¶¶ 40–42 (“[I]nterpretations can be issued
on the initiative of the committees or commissions, at the request of either
of the contracting parties, at the request of the tribunal if a respondent
or a disputing party asks for an interpretation, or as the result of various
combinations of grounds.”).
174. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission from the Government of South
Africa, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176, ¶
20 (2019) (“South Africa is of the view that we cannot divorce the
procedural from substantive concerns as they are intricately related.
Given that the UNICTRAL process is government-led and the
Commission when giving the mandate agreed that broad discretion should
be left to the Working Group in discharging its mandate, the Working
Group would not be fully discharging its mandate if discussions on the
substantive concerns were excluded.”); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.,
Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission
from the Government of Bahrain, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.180, ¶ 65 (2019) (“Bahrain shares the views
expressed by the governments of Thailand and Indonesia in their remarks
to Working Group III that restricting consideration of ISDS reform to
procedural aspects alone – without considering reform of substantive
treaty protections – is a missed opportunity.”).
175. See Submission from the Government of South Africa, supra note 174;
Submission from the Government of Bahrain, supra note 175.
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pro-investor interpretations at the expense of states.” 176 The Working
Groups Reports have intermittently displayed accommodative
flexibility in bringing compelling substantive issues under the wing of
identified procedural concerns. 177 However, by improving some of these
First-Generation Rights, there might be trickle down reforms in
substantive Second- and Third-Generation Rights, for example, the
appointment of arbitrators.
B. Can the Multilateral Investment Court Provide Solutions for the
Future of Human Rights in ISDS?

The Multilateral Investment Court proposal seeks to recognize that
the current ISDS framework is administered, by ICSID or other centers,
where tribunals are set up on a case-by-case basis, and are thus heavily
fragmented. Thus, a radical overhaul of a fragmented ISDS framework
is spearheaded by the European Union, by seeking to establish a
permanent investment court, with sovereign appointed adjudicators
akin to other international judicial bodies such as the ICJ, ICC, and
ITLOS. 178 A first step towards establishing a court system was seen in
agreements between the EU and Canada (CETA), 179 as well as
negotiations with multiple other States. 180 While emerging as a
European reform proposal, today, it forms a part of UNCITRAL
Working Group III’s 181 discussion mandate—emanating out of the
176. Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE
HALL L. SCH. (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/publicstatement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/
[https://perma.cc/U5YS-F5Y8].
177. See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Appellate and Multilateral
Court
Mechanisms,
Note
by
Secretariat,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP/185 (July 17, 2019) [hereinafter Possible Reform of
ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms]; U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade L., Submission from the European Union and Its Member
States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (Jan. 24, 2019)
[hereinafter Submission from the European Union and Its Member States].
178. See generally Submission from the European Union and Its Member
States, supra note 177.
179. See generally Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-European Union Ch. 8 Sec. F, Oct. 30,
2016.
180. See Legislative Train 10.2020 3 International Trade – INTA: TTIP
Negotiations on Investment Court System for TTIP, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/themeinternational-trade-inta/file-ttip-investment-court-system-for-ttip
[https://perma.cc/NPR7-Y6A8].
181. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L., Rep. of Working Grp III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Resumed Thirty-Eighth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1004/Add.1 (Jan. 28, 2020).
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European Union’s proposal for a standing Multilateral Investment
Court. 182
EU’s proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court envisioned a
two-tier system of adjudication. 183 Decisions of the tribunal of first
instances would be appealable before a multilateral appellate body
staffed by tenured judicial figures. 184 Appeal procedures would be open
only for errors of law (including serious procedural shortcoming) or
manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts. 185 The appeal
mechanism would further be ring-fenced from abusive practices by
mechanisms such as provision of security. 186 The proposal for a standing
multilateral court may be indicative of trust in practical experiences of

182. See generally Submission from the European Union and Its Member
States, supra note 177.
183. See generally Possible Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court
Mechanisms, supra note 177, ¶ 47 (“A multilateral appellate body could
also be established as a second tier in a multilateral investment court,
staffed by tenured, professional judges and supported by a permanent
secretariat.”).
184. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court
Mechanisms, supra note 177, ¶ 47 (“A multilateral appellate body could
also be established as a second tier in a multilateral investment court,
staffed by tenured, professional judges and supported by a permanent
secretariat.”); Submission from the European Union and Its Member
States, supra note 177, ¶ 53 (“Instead, adjudicators would be considered
independent and impartial on account of their tenure and it would only
be in very specific limited cases that a potential conflict of interest might
arise and would need to be dealt with.”).
185. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra
note 177 (“[A]ppellate tribunal would hear appeals from the tribunal of
first instance. Grounds of appeal should be error of law (including serious
procedural shortcomings) or manifest errors in the appreciation of the
facts. It should not undertake a de novo review of the facts”); Possible
Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms, supra
note 177, ¶ 19 (“A question for consideration is whether an appellate
mechanism should provide for a review of issues de novo or whether it
should accord some degree of deference to the findings of the first
adjudicator. Formulations limiting the appeal to “clear”, “serious” or
“manifest” errors of law/assessment of the facts, depending on the
grounds for appeal, would thus limit the scope of review, and define the
“balance of power” between the first and second tier. In a Submission, it
is suggested that an appellate mechanism should be tasked to review, in
addition to errors of law, manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts,
but that it should not undertake a de novo review of the facts (see below,
para. 53)”).
186. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra
note 177.
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the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism. 187 Quite akin to the WTO,
the EU proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court suggests full-time
adjudicators would not conduct external activities, subject to strict
ethical requirements similar to other international courts. 188 Like
UNCITRAL Working Group III, the proposal in its birthing stages
emphasizes certain limited First-Generation Rights with minimal
references to Second-and Third-Generation Rights. The only linkage to
Second- and Third-Generation Rights is seen from a linkage to other
reforms expounded above; specifically, the possibility of
counterclaims. 189
Finally, third-party participation as a lighthouse for transparency
in proceedings has been highlighted and, taking the example of
communities affected by the dispute participating in proceedings, 190 the
Working Group has alluded to the possibility of Second-Generation
Rights coming into play. 191 Yet, there exists limited substantive
guidance on this issue within the proposal for a Multilateral Investment
Court.

187. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of
China, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177, at 4
(July 19, 2019) (“The practical experience of the World Trade
Organization dispute settlement mechanism reflects the relatively high
efficiency of its appeal mechanism as well as its moderate operating
costs.”).
188. See generally Multilateral Investment Court: Overview of the Reform
Proposals and Prospects, EUR. PARLIAMENT THINK TANK (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference
=EPRS_BRI(2020)646147 [https://perma.cc/7XZ3-7G99].
189. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra
note 177, ¶ 70 (“A standing mechanism might also include (i) mechanisms
for ensuring early dismissal of unfounded claims; (ii) a possibility for
encouraging parties to solve their dispute through mediation; (iii) a
mechanism to cater for possible counter-claims by respondents”).
190. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra
note 177, ¶¶ 28–29 (“A high level of transparency of the proceedings
should be ensured. . . . It should also be provided that third parties, for
example representatives of communities affected by the dispute, be
permitted to participate in investment disputes.”)
191. See Nicholas J. Diamond & Kabir A.N. Duggal, ISDS Reform and
Advancing All “Generations of Human Rights, WOLTERS KLUWER
(June 17, 2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/06/17/isds-reformand-advancing-all-generations-of-human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/TJ5Z-8C3A].

147

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New
Investment Treaties Support Human Rights?

VI. Evaluating Recent State Practice and How It
May Impact Human Rights
As noted above, a common criticism faced by international
investment law is the allegation that substantive obligations, as
envisioned under international investment agreements, competes with
a State’s power to regulate. 192 As a result, States have proceeded to
include treaty safeguards and provisions of various forms (which shall
be discussed in greater detail) to actively assert the prominence of the
State’s regulatory right and human rights in the ISDS framework. 193
It is noteworthy to make a preliminary observation at this stage
that the inclusion of provisions affirming State’s right to regulate may
be viewed in two ways. First, the new treaties may suggest that core
investment obligations have always provided for a certain margin for
the State regulatory powers. The inclusion of provisions affirming
State’s right to regulate is a mere re-statement of the existing view of
States. 194 Second, the new treaties suggest an active paradigm shift
towards State’s asserting a shift in how the Tribunal must interpret
investment obligations in a manner that does not second-guess the
regulatory choices of the State organs. Such a view would radically
change the core of existing investment obligations. 195
The conundrum mentioned above may take different shapes and
forms depending on the particular wordings of the treaty. This paper
attempts to map investment agreements entered into since 2018. Of a
total of 66 investment agreements, the English versions, a total of 38
agreements, are publicly available from a wide array of States in both
developing and developed countries. This provides a meaningful insight
into what States are doing in light of the backlash against ISDS. The
subsequent section delves into the different shapes and forms in which
States have attempted to incorporate Second- and Third-Generation
Human Rights into investment agreements.

192. See
D.
SCHNEIDERMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING
ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 43
(2008) (“While seemingly providing some stability to investment
interests, it destabilizes the capacity for self-government represented by
constitutional rules that enable democratic processes to do their work”).
193. See generally Investment Protection Agreement, art. 2.2, European
Union-Viet., June 30, 2019.
194. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),
art. 8.9, ¶1, European Union-Can., Oct. 30, 2016.
195. Id. ¶ 2–4.
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Α. Treaty Practice 2018-2020
1. References in a Treaty’s Preamble

In unsurprising contrast to the BITs concluded in 2000, 196 a little
over 95 percent of investment agreements signed since 2018 include
references to health and safety, environment or sustainable
development in the treaty. 197 Only two IIAs within the scope of the
analysis provide no specific reference to health, environment, or the
State’s regulatory space. 198 IIAs surveyed for the purposes of this paper
concluded between 2018 and 2020 may be bestowed the moniker “New
Age Investment Agreements” as they have adopted various tools to
avoid legitimate regulation by a State to safeguard the rights of its
citizens is put to test before an investment tribunal. Select key tools
include the references in an IIA’s preamble, provisions preserving policy
space for regulating in the public interest, exclusion of welfare measures
from expropriation, and general exception provisions. 199
Preambles are generally the first harbor for the tribunal’s search
for the purpose and objective of a treaty and form an important
interpretative tool. 200 Although preambular recitals are not an operative
legal part of the treaty, 201 they may suggest the object and purpose of

196. International Investment Agreements Issues Note: Recent Developments
in the International Investment Regime, UNCTAD (May 2018)
[hereinafter
UNCTAD],
https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/diaepcbinf2018d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNT5-TDFL].
197. See generally id.
198. See generally Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Kaz.-U.A.E., Mar.
24, 2018 [hereinafter Kazakhstan-UAE BIT, 2018]; Agreement between
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic
of China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates: For The
Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, H.K.-U.A.E., June
16, 2019 [hereinafter Hong Kong-China-UAE BIT, 2019].
199. See UNCTAD, supra note 196.
200. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31(1)–(2), May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose . . . . The context for the
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes.”); see also Enron Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 259 (May 22,
2007) (“The Tribunal gives weight to the text of the Treaty’s Preamble .
. . .”).
201. Jan Klabbers, Treaties and Their Preambles, in CONCEPTUAL AND
CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES
172,172 (Michael J. Bowman & Dino Kritsiotis ed., 2018)
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a treaty, and are also part of the treaty’s context. 202 The range of
treaties surveyed under this paper shows that 28% of treaties do not
expressly mention protection of public health, environment and
regulatory autonomy in their preambles. 203 This is seen even in treaties
that are heavily protective of Second-Generation Rights of public health
and environmental protection, in the form of various other treaty
mechanisms. 204
When it comes to preambles themselves, States have adopted
different approaches. Reserving rights in the preamble, for example,
some treaties provide that: “resolving to preserve their flexibility to set
legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public welfare, and
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial
system and public morals.” 205 Some anchor obligations with
international standards in the preamble’s language, with investments
being made in consonance with Second-Generation Rights, for example:
“seeking to ensure that investment is consistent with the protection of
health, safety and the environment, the promotion and protection of
internationally and domestically recognised human rights, labour rights,
and internationally recognised standards of corporate social
responsibility.” 206 This stands in contrast with forward-looking

202. See id. at 184–88.
203. This is based on authors’ analysis of IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020
listed and publicly available as of August 2020 via UNCTAD’S
International Investment Agreement Navigator. See generally
International
Investment
Agreements
Navigator,
UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements [https://perma.cc/C5A4-4TJP].
204. See generally Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between
the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, Braz.-India,
Jan. 25, 2020 [hereinafter Brazil-India BIT, 2020]; Treaty between the
Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on Investments, Belr.-India,
Sept. 24, 2018 [hereinafter Belarus-India BIT, 2018].
205. See Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Japan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Morocco-Japan, Jan. 8, 2020
[hereinafter Japan-Morocco BIT, 2020]; Agreement between Australia and
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Apr. 5, 2019 [hereinafter Australia-Uruguay BIT, 2019].
206. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and
the Government of Hungary, Belr. -Hung., Jan. 14, 2019; Agreement
Between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the
Republic of Cape Verde for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Hung.-Cape Verde, Mar. 28, 2019 [hereinafter Cabo VerdeHungary BIT, 2019].
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preambles that seek to preserve the State’s regulatory flexibility.207
Some reference a general right to preserve autonomy, for example:
“Reaffirming their regulatory autonomy and policy space.” 208 The
essence of the matter being, preambles affirming State’s emphasis on
protection of Second-Generation Rights were once known as “nontraditional preambles,” 209 have now come to be a mainstay in
investment agreements (albeit in differing formats).

207. Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206 (“Seeking to ensure that
investment is consistent with the protection of health, safety and the
environment, the promotion and protection of internationally and
domestically recognised human rights, labour rights, and internationally
recognised standards of corporate social responsibility”); Agreement
Between the Republic of Belarus and the Government of Hungary for the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Belr.-Hung., Jan.
14, 2019 (“Seeking to ensure that investment is consistent with the
protection of health, safety and the environment, the promotion and
protection of internationally and domestically recognised human rights,
labour rights, and internationally recognised standards of corporate social
responsibility.”)
208. See Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Co-Operative Republic of Guyana
Preamble, Braz.-Guy., Dec. 13, 2018 [hereinafter Brazil-Guyana BIT,
2018] (“Reaffirming their regulatory autonomy and policy space”);
Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Suriname Preamble,
May, 2, 2018 [hereinafter Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018] (“Reassuring their
regulatory autonomy and each Party’s policy space”)
209. See UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS
IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, at 5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IID.16 (2007)
(Table 2. Examples of non-traditional preambles. BIT between the
Republic of Korea and Trinidad & Tobago (2002) “The Government of
the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Contracting Parties’), Desiring
to intensify economic cooperation between both States, Intending to
create favourable conditions for investments by investors of one
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, based
on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, Recognizing that the
promotion and protection of investments on the basis of this Agreement
will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and
will increase prosperity in both States, Respecting the sovereignty and
laws of the Contracting Party within whose jurisdiction the investments
fall, and Convinced that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing
health, safety and environmental measures of general application, Have
agreed as follows: . . .”)
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Figure 1 210

PREAMBLE OF INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 2018 TO 2020
Mention of public health, environment or
regulatory autonomy
No mention of public heath, environment or
regulatory autonomy
28%

72%

2.

Provisions Preserving Policy Space for Regulating in the Public
Interest

Another tool for attempting to safeguard Second-Generation Rights
of health and environment, as well as a State’s broader regulatory space
is seen in the form of a specific treaty provision. 211 Countries have
attempted to protect public welfare measures more broadly by adding
general language supporting a “right to regulate.” 212 For example, the
EU–Vietnam IPA provides that “[t]he Parties reaffirm their right to
regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives,
such as the protection of public health, safety, environment or public
210. This is based on authors’ analysis of IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020
listed and publicly available as of August 2020 via UNCTAD’S
International Investment Agreement Navigator. See International
Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 203.
211. See Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Policy Space in
Investment Agreement, INST. OF INT’L ECON. L. ISSUE BRIEF 4 (2017)
(“In recent years, governments have paid greater attention to this issue
and negotiated a series of provisions aimed at further safeguarding public
interest. These include express provisions on the host state’s right to
regulate, interpretive statements, provisions designed to narrow the scope
of expropriation and FET, preambular language underscoring the
importance of public policy concerns, and as mentioned above and the
focus of this Issue Brief, general exceptions clauses”).
212. See EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
art. 8.9, ¶1, European Union-Can., Oct. 30, 2016.
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morals, social or consumer protection, or promotion and protection of
cultural diversity.” 213 Treaty practices indicate that such provisions
seeking to preserve the State’s policy space for regulating in the public
interest are primarily worded in three forms.
First, a slew of investment agreements include a provision stating
that nothing within the agreement would prevent the State from
regulating investment activity to further protect of Second-Generation
Rights such as public health, environment and labor rights. 214 At the
same time, they do not explicitly affirm an obligation of non-dilution
of Second-Generation Rights by the States in order to attract
investments. For example, the Peru–Australia FTA provides that
“[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.” 215
Second, another set of investment-agreements merely affirms an
obligation on States to not dilute existing Second-Generation Rights
frameworks (such as environmental, labor and health laws) in order to
attract investments. Such agreements do not include the second limb
that makes an affirmation that nothing within the agreement would
preclude the State’s right to regulate. 216 This trend is primarily seen in
investment agreements signed by Japan after 2018. 217

213. Investment Protection Agreement art. 2.2, European Union-Viet., June
30, 2019.
214. See, e.g., id.; Cabo-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206, at art.3; Hong
Kong-China-UAE BIT, 2019, supra note 198, at art. 15; Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government
of Hungary for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
art. 3, Belr.- Hung., Jan. 14, 2019.
215. Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 8.16, Peru-Austl., Feb. 12,
2018.
216. See generally Cabo-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206, at art. 3.
217. See, e.g., Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Japan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Morocco-Japan art.19, Aug. 1,
2020 [hereinafter Japan-Morocco BIT] (“Each Contracting Party shall
refrain from encouraging investments by investors of the other
Contracting Party by relaxing its health, safety or environmental
measures, or by lowering its labour standards. To this effect, each
Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such
measures or standards as an encouragement for the establishment,
acquisition or expansion in its Territory of investments by Investors of
the other Contracting Party”).
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Third, some provisions provide for a two-pronged approach: 218 the
provision states that nothing within the agreement would prevent the
State from regulating investment activity for the further protection of
Second-Generation Rights such as public health, environment and labor
rights; the provision affirms that the State may not dilute existing
Second-Generation Rights framework of the State in order to attract
investment. This trend is primarily seen in investment agreements
signed by Brazil after 2018. 219
Fourth, another example found in investment agreements is when
a State has sought to exclude a dispute resolution framework from the
scope of its provisions. 220 As an example, the Brazil–Suriname BIT
provides that certain articles may not be subject to arbitration,
including Article 6(1) on combatting corruption, Article 15 on CSR,
and Article 17 on the environment, labor, and health.221

218. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between the
EFTA States and The Republic of Ecuador, Art. 4.6, June 25, 2018;
Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
Between the Argentine Republic and the United Arab Emerites, Arg.U.A.E., art. 12, Apr. 16, 2018 [hereinafter Argentine-UAE BIT].
219. See, e.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, art. 6, Jan. 25,
2020; Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement Between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emitates, Braz.U.A.E., art. 17, Mar. 15, 2019; Brazil-Guyana BIT, 2018, supra note 208,
at art. 17; Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018, supra note 208, at art.17;
Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and
Facilitation, art. 16, Apr. 11, 2018.
220. See, e.g., Brazil-Guyana BIT, 2018, supra note 208, art. 25.3; BrazilSuriname BIT, supra note 209, 2018, art. 25.3, Argentine-UAE BIT, supra
note 218, art. 21.1 (b).
221. Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018, supra note 208, at art. 25.3.
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Figure 2 222

INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND
OTHER REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 2018:2020
Absent
Only non dilution of standards to attract investment
On affirmation of right to regulate
Contains both prongs
Contains both prongs and is placed outside the purview of dispute resolution
21%
16%

8%

24%

16%

39%

3. Exclusion of Welfare Measures from Indirect Expropriation

Twenty-eight of the thirty-eight treaties surveyed for the purposes
of this paper include a clarificatory note to the provision on
expropriation. 223 Treaties have more broad and uniform language, such
as: “[n]on-discriminatory legal measures designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.” 224
222. International
Investment
Agreements
Navigator,
UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements [perma.cc/3Z7X-LJLV] (Based on authors’ analysis of
publicly available IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020).
223. See, e.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, art. 6, Jan. 25,
2020.
224. Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on The Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Cambodia, art. 5.2, Oct. 21, 2018;
Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the Promotion
and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 6, Dec. 1, 2018; Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
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This clear and unequivocal clarification by States with regard to
primacy of regulation safeguarding Second- and Third-Generation
Rights has emerged in the backdrop of a barrage of investment claims
against environmental and public health regulation, 225 among other
policies, with recent cases relating to industries such as mining,
pharmaceuticals, 226 and tobacco 227 causing controversy and concern.
Such claims demonstrate increasing legal sophistication by claimants in
exploiting open-textured provisions and tribunals adopting the sole
effects doctrine 228 to adjudicate indirect expropriation claims.
Clarificatory notes with regard to indirect expropriation may seek to
effectively stem such claims and lift off the shroud of regulatory chill
from the States in order to safeguard Second-Generation Rights of the
citizens.
4. General Exception Provisions

Close to sixty-eight percent of investment agreements executed
since 2018 contain a General Exceptions provision. 229 The General
Exceptions provision finds its origin in Art. XX of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 230 and is structured in three
distinct elements (a similar structuring is seen both in investment
agreements as well as Art. XX of the GATT): (1) an exhaustive list of
permissible policy objectives (pursuant to which States may enact
measures in contravention of general treaty obligations);231 (2) a nexus
Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Mutual
Protection of Investments, Kaz.-Sing., art. 6.6, Nov. 21, 2018; Agreement
Between the Governemnt of the Republic of Korea and the Government
of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, S. Kor.-Arm., annex 1.3(b), Oct. 19, 2018.
225. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Final Award on
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005).
226. See Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., Biofarma, S.A.S., Arts et Techniques
du Progres S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2012).
227. See Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/07, Award, (July 8, 2016).
228. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 116 (May
29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. (“The government’s intention is less important
than the effects of the measures on the owner of the assets or on the
benefits arising from such assets affected by the measures; and the form
of the deprivation measure is less important than its actual effects.”).
229. See supra text accompanying note 211.
230. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pt.5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
231. Id. at (a)–(f).
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requirement (which highlights the relation between the measure
undertaken and the policy goal sought); 232 and (3) the chapeau
requirement (the measure should not be arbitrary or cause unjustifiable
discrimination where like conditions prevail or disguised restrictions on
trade and investments exist). 233 Investment agreements signed since
2018 show a rapid upsurge in the incorporation of the General
Exceptions provision. 234 General Exceptions provisions seek to provide
a last line of defense for States in cases where measures taken to protect
public health, environment, etc. are challenged. 235
There are two forms under investment treaties that the provisions
are structured around. 236 Forty-seven percent of treaties see a mutatis
mutandis incorporation of all three elements of Article XX of the
GATT. 237 Twenty-one percent incorporate a General Exceptions
provision with certain limited modifications. 238 Several trends persist.
First, the General Exceptions provision may be invoked only in cases
where the claim pertains to National Treatment or the MFN
provisions. 239 Second, the General Exceptions provision may be invoked
232. Id. at (g)–(k).
233. GATT, supra note 230.
234. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 222.
235. See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14–18, (Cambridge Univ. Press,
2012).
236. Levent Sabanogullari, The Merits and Limitations of General Exception
Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Practice, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS (May 21, 2015),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2015/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-ofgeneral-exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/
[perma.cc/K88M-ZHAD] (“There are two different models of general
exceptions in IIAs—one that follows theapproach of Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and another that is
modelled on Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).”).
237. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 15, Dec. 1,
2018; Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between the
EFTA States and The Republic of Ecuador, Art. 6.3, June 25, 2018;
Agreement Between Japan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and
Protection of investment, art. 15, Japan-Jordan, Nov. 27, 2018; Economic
Partnership Agreement, CARIFORUM States-U.K., art. 224, 2019;
Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on
Investments, Belr.-India, art. 32, Sept. 24, 2018.
238. See International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 222.
239. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, E.U.-Viet., June 12, 2020, Art. 8.53. (“Subject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
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solely where the claim pertains to the National Treatment provision.240
Third, the General Exceptions provision may partially incorporate of
the chapeau from Art. XX of the GATT. 241 The General Exceptions
provision contains a protective mechanism to prevent abuse by States.
This is in the form of ensuring that the measures are not arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
investment.242 The India-Kyrgyz BIT and the 2019 and the 2018
Cambodia-Turkey BIT 243 incorporate only a single limb of this chapeau
by requiring the measure to only be non-discriminatory. 244 Fourth, the
General Exceptions provision may completely omit the chapeau.245 The
2018 Argentina–UAE BIT peculiarly omits both requirements of the

would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on establish mentor operation of an enterprise or cross-border supply of
services, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as preventing the
adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures”).
240. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the
Republic of Singapore, art. 8.62, Oct. 19, 2018 (“Subject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the
other Party where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
establishment or cross-border supply of services, nothing in this Chapter
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a Party of
measures . . . necessary to protect public security or public morals or to
maintain public order.”).
241. See Levent Sabanogullari, supra note 236.
242. Id.
243. See Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Turkey and
the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on The Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Cambodia, art. 4.1, Oct.
21, 2018 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any nondiscriminatory legal measures”).
244. See Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Kyrgyz
Republic and the Government of the Republic of India, Kyrg-India, art.
32.1, June 14, 2019 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures of general
applicability applied on a non discriminatory basis that are necessary to:
(i) protect public morals or maintaining public order; (ii) protect human,
animal or plant life or health”).
245. See Argentine-UAE BIT, art. 18 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall
prevent the implementation by either Party of measures it deems
necessary in order to: (a) maintain public order; (b) protect its own
national interests, including its essential security interests; (c) fulfil its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security; (d) protect human, animal and plant life or health”).
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measure being non-discriminatory as well as not being a disguised
restriction on international investment. 246

Figure 3 247

GENERAL EXCEPTION PROVISION 2018:2020
General Exception Provision modelled on Article XX GATT
Modified version of Article XX GATT
Absent

32%
47%

21%

The table below summarizes the State practice in the newgeneration treaties:

Provision
Example forms of treaty practice
References in an
• Preserve a “general” right to a
IIA’s preamble
state’s regulatory space
• Preserve
certain
specifically
identified rights that are protected
within the ambit of a State’s
regulatory powers (e.g., health,
environment)

246. Id.
247. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 222.
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Provision

Operative
provisions
preserving a State’s
regulatory/policy
space

Operative
provisions
excluding welfare
measures from the
scope of indirect
expropriation
clause
General Exception
provisions

Example forms of treaty practice
• Require investments to be made in
conformity with international
standards
• Protect a State’s right to adopt
measures in the public interest
• Affirm an obligation not to dilute
public interest matters
• Exclude public interest matters
from the scope of the dispute
resolution clause
• Combinations of the approaches
above
• Provisions that clarify that
nondiscriminatory measures to
further legitimate public welfare
objectives are not considered an
indirect expropriation, although
such measures may be challenged
as discriminatory or illegitimate
• Provisions
incorporating
exceptions modeled on GATT,
Art. XX, either in whole or in part
VII. Looking Ahead

While several entrenched barriers have hindered the role of human
rights within the ISDS system, notable movement to better recognize
human rights within ISDS reform efforts and new IIAs have emerged.
Such developments are no doubt positive, but we caution that progress
may be slower than stakeholders might appreciate. Moreover, the scope
of this progress may be restricted to First-Generation Rights (as in
ISDS reform proposals), and only very select Second- and ThirdGeneration Rights (as in new IIAs). Equally, we caution that this
bifurcated approach, whereby ISDS reform efforts and new IIAs have
been largely pursued separate and distinct from each other, may result
in further inconsistencies and a general lack of alignment, suggesting
the persistence of the above-mentioned entrenched barriers. Finally, it
bears mention that the ultimate arbiter, as it were, of the future
intersection of ISDS and human rights remains how reforms and new
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IIAs impact arbitral practice. If meaningful change is to emerge, it must
be evident in the outcomes of investment disputes.
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